The first chapter of Code is essentially laying out the rest of the book for the reader. Lawrence Lessig first draws a parallel between cyberspace as it exists today, in essential anarchy, and the state of the Eastern Bloc directly following the fall of communism. It is anarchy and that is how many wish it to stay, without any restrictions on freedom. However, he goes on to make the case that although this has its merits, eventually some form of government will emerge. This will not be a constitutional, top-down government. Rather, the “invisible hand” of cyberspace will eventually craft a bottom-up regulation. He is not specific on what type of regulation will emerge, since no one can predict that, but he says that many of the freedoms that currently exist in cyberspace will no longer exist in the coming years. He seems to argue that this structure is needed, and one can only assume he will back this up with reasons later on.
In chapter two, Lessig goes into the separation between our real lives and the lives we lead online. He cites two examples to start. The first is an argument between two people playing a massively multiplayer online game (MMOG), and arguing over who is at fault, the man whose dog is dead, or the woman whose poisonous flowers the dog ate. The resolution they come to is that the woman make her flowers poisonous only when on her property or when bought by someone else. Lessig uses this story to illustrate that in the virtual world, there are solutions to problems not available in the real world. The second example is that of a state that outlaws gambling in its borders. In response, one of the citizens sets up a gambling website based on an offshore server. Regulation of the activity becomes very difficult, if not impossible, for the state. He goes on to list many more stories and examples, including a man who wrote disturbing stories online and a theoretical worm, but his main point in this chapter seems to be that the rules we apply to the real world rarely translate perfectly into cyberspace. We cannot simply transfer our constitution into cyberspace and be done with it. For there to be regulation in cyberspace, it will have to built from the ground up, and completely new.
In chapter three, Lessig begins outlining two different types of networks at the extremes of control. One is the University of Chicago network, which essentially lets anyone with an Ethernet port get onto their system. The other is Harvard’s system, which requires that one register, and be monitored the entire time they are on the network. He then goes on to describe how the Internet as it was in the 1990s is largely the way it is today: unregulated and unsupervised. he argues that the Internet will see a shift in the coming years to something more like Harvard’s system. The point he tries to make, however, is that supervision is not so important as identification. Removing the anonymity is the trend he sees for the Internet. He says that such a system could be laid on top of the existing Internet, thereby keeping most of its functionality.
The fourth chapter begins with a discussion on authentication and anonymity. Lessig gives examples of authentication in real life versus those on the Internet. One of these examples is a child who is trying to view pornography on the Internet. In real life, a child would have a extremely difficult time disguising himself as an adult, because his physical attributes give him away. By contrast, on the Internet, it is very easy for that same child to lie about his age and access pornography. He goes on to describe the reason for this is in the current structure of the Internet. The TCP/IP system doesn’t check or care about the information in the packets except the IP address they came from and the IP address they’re being sent to. Cookies are (at least in his view) a step in the right direction, as they allow the website to remember all the information you have previously given it. He also goes into Single Sign On technology, which works a bit like online ID badges. Lessig then talks about Microsoft’s Identity Layer, which it is currently working on. This layer would essentially provide only the information a certain website needed at any given time, like age, citizenship, and so on. Packet sniffing programs are also mentioned. He says that in order to regulate the Net, one needs to know who is sending information, what they are sending, and from where.
Chapter five continues the theme of regulability, addressing the issue of the government regulating code in order to regulate behavior on the Internet. It starts with Lessig describing a situation where the government mandated that phone companies write their code so that their phones can still be wiretapped. Another situation was described where the FBI wanted information from cell phone calls collected every time they were used, and for that information to be retrievable by the FBI whenever there was a “legitimate law enforcement reason.” The government can actually be far more indirect than this, however. They once tried to subsidize the development of Clipper encryption technology, thereby making it the cheapest and then everyone would use something the government knew how to break. Another strategy mentioned by Lessig is the idea of having everyone use an online ID, not by forcing it on them, but by providing very strong incentives to use one. The difference between “East Coast Code”(code made by Congress in the form of laws) and “West Coast Code” (that written in Silicon Valley) is also explored. He also addresses one of my biggest irritations with the book so far: that there will always be ways to remain anonymous. However, he makes a good point that just because a lock can be picked does not make a lock useless. His next point is about the current architecture of the Internet shaping its use. Because there are really no restrictions on what can be done, it breeds people who want to do harm.
By the end of Part I, Lessig has made his case that the forces that are turning the Internet into something far more regulable cannot be stopped. They will continue until the Internet has changed, radically, and there is little we can do to stop it. More importantly, his point is that very few will want to stop it.
